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Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2001 Nobel Laureate in Economics, 
helped create the theory of markets with asymmetric 
information and was one of the founders of modern 
development economics.  He played a leading role in an 
intellectual revolution that changed the characterization 
of a market economy.  In the new paradigm, the price 
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system only imperfectly solves the information problem 
of scarcity because of the many other information 
problems that arise in the economy:  the selection 
over hidden characteristics, the provision of incentives 
for hidden behaviors and for innovation, and the 
coordination of choices over institutions.   
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Stiglitz, Joseph E. (born 1943) 
 
 
Joseph E. Stiglitz helped create the economics of information, which analyzes 
equilibrium in markets in which there are asymmetries of information among the market 
participants. For that work, he received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001, jointly 
with George A. Akerlof and A. Michael Spence.  Stiglitz’s work demonstrated the many 
and sometimes subtle ways in which markets can fail to lead to efficient outcomes.  His 
work elucidated a broad set of phenomena that had largely been ignored before 1970 
because they were outside the limits of the standard paradigm:  incentive contracts, 
bankruptcy, quantity rationing, financial structure, equilibrium price distributions, 
innovation, and dysfunctional institutions.  This work contributed to a paradigm shift in 
economics.  In the new paradigm, the price system only imperfectly solves the 
information problem of scarcity because of the many other information problems that 
arise in the economy.  Stiglitz has also proved central theorems in many fields:  
development economics, finance, trade theory, public economics, and industrial 
organization.   
The broad plan from which much of Stiglitz’s work originates had two central goals.  
The first was to show that many of the implications of the standard neoclassical model do 
not remain valid once the assumption of perfect information is dropped. His famous 
paper on adverse selection (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) opens with these words:   
 
Economic theorists traditionally banish discussions of information to footnotes.  
Serious consideration of costs of communication, imperfect knowledge, and the like 
would, it is believed, complicate without informing.  … [T]his comforting myth is 
false.  Some of the most important conclusions of economic theory are not robust to 
considerations of imperfect information. (1976, p. 629) 
 
The second goal was to provide a better theoretical understanding of the workings 
of the economic system as a whole. As Stiglitz (2007) explains,   
 
By the time I had finished my graduate studies, I had realized that the model of 
the economic system that was being taught – and that was at the center of policy 
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analyses – was not a model of a modern capitalist economy.  It was little more 
than a fancy version of a primitive agriculture exchange/production economy, 
slightly updated to include manufacturing – so long as there were diminishing 
returns.  There was but a short distance between Ricardo and Walras, and between 
Walras and Samuelson. . . .  
…Capital was nothing more than seed that was harvested but not 
consumed…  
…technology was stagnant (or at most exogenous).     
 
A critical assumption of the standard neoclassical model is that there is a price for 
each quality of good in the market and for each action one would wish to contract for. 
Buyers have no problem ascertaining quality, and firms produce the quality that they 
have agreed to produce.  Firms do not need to motivate their workers.  Lenders do not 
worry about borrowers repaying.  Owners do not worry about managers taking the right 
actions.  Stiglitz in his lectures to students in the 1980s gave the example of a stylist 
cutting hair: in the standard model, there would be a price for each hair that he cut.   
A real-life experiment that helped economists evaluate the standard neoclassical 
theory were the experiences with market socialism in Eastern Europe, in which 
government owned the firms but there was a manager of each firm whose job it was to 
maximize profits of that firm, facing market prices. Stiglitz (1994) argues that if the 
neoclassical model were an accurate characterization of a market economy, then market 
socialism would have been successful.  Because of the importance of incentive problems 
and of non-price institutions (such as banks) within the economy, the inefficiencies that 
arose under market socialism were not accidents, but rather the inevitable consequence of 
(a) the limitations of the information contained in prices, and (b) the gap between the set 
of goods for which markets can practically exist and the much broader set of present and 
future goods and actions on which welfare depends. 
Two ideas inform much of Stiglitz’s work. 
1.  The ‘control/information’ system of market economies embraces far more than the 
price system of the neoclassical model.  The exchange problem is intertwined with the 
process of selection over hidden characteristics, the provision of incentives for hidden 
behaviors and for innovation, and the coordination of choices over institutions.   
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2.  Competitive equilibrium in economies with imperfect information and missing 
markets is not, in general, Pareto efficient. Market outcomes can be improved on by 
government intervention, e.g., taxes and subsidies. A simple illustration is that if the care 
that the insured take to avoid an accident is not observable to the insurance company, 
then commodities like fire extinguishers that decrease insured agents’ losses should be 
subsidized, while commodities like alcohol that increase their losses should be taxed 
(Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986, p. 247).  
Until Arrow’s work on medical care (Arrow, 1963), the only reasons for a missing 
market that had been well explored were environmental externalities and the inability, or 
undesirability, to exclude from use (the problem of public goods).  Stiglitz’s contributions 
would help to radically broaden the understanding of the sources of externalities to 
include information externalities, group reputation effects, agglomeration effects, 
knowledge spillovers, and pecuniary externalities (see, for example, Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 1986 on pecuniary externalities and Hoff, 2001 on coordination failures).  In the 
process, Stiglitz’s work would help to change the profession’s understanding of 
capitalism, although the policy recommendations of economists did not change as much 
as Stiglitz had hoped.  
Citations are an objective, if imperfect, measure of influence.  Kim, Morse and 
Zingales (2006) compiled a list of the 146 articles published in economics journals from 
1970 to 2002 that had received by June 2006 more than 500 citations from the ISI Web of 
Science/Social Science Citation Index.  Six of Stiglitz’s papers appear on this list (no 
other author has more). In descending order of number of citations, the papers are Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1984), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).  This 
article will place each of these papers in the context of Stiglitz’s research program. 
 
Biographical data 
Stiglitz’s early experiences shaped his lifelong professional interests in understanding 
how an economy handles risk, and in bringing economic theory to bear on real-world 
problems.   Stiglitz was born in Gary, Indiana, a city marred, in his words, by ‘huge 
inequality, poverty, and discrimination’ (Stiglitz, 2007).  He was the middle of three 
     5
children. After the failure of an earlier business, his father became an independent 
insurance agent.  One part of his job was to find new insurers for firms whose businesses 
had burned down and whose insurance policies had been cancelled.  Stiglitz’s mother 
worked in the family insurance business when Stiglitz was young and later taught 
elementary school in a low-income inner city neighborhood of Gary. After retiring from 
elementary education, she worked in adult remedial education, where she encountered 
some of the same students whom she had taught as children in inner-city schools.  
Stiglitz’s genius was recognized early.  In high school, he was assigned independent 
study in lieu of some of the regular classes, which he had outstripped.  (His father 
apparently took this the wrong way:  he was concerned that something might be wrong 
with the other children in the school.)   Stiglitz followed his older brother to Amherst 
College and graduated in 1964.  There he studied economics, physics, history and 
mathematics, and was president of his senior class.  In that position, he was a maverick:  
he tried unsuccessfully to stop the college from funding the training of Amherst sports 
teams in Bermuda during college vacations, and organized an exchange program between 
Amherst and a segregated college in the US South. 
He obtained a Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1967. 
Stiglitz (2007) writes that particularly important influences at MIT on his later work were 
his statistics teacher, Harold Freeman, who taught the recently developed theory of 
subjective probability, and Ken Arrow, with whom he took a class as a second-year 
graduate student.  At that time, Arrow was writing the final formalization of the Arrow–
Debreu paradigm.  Realizing the model’s limitations, Arrow was also beginning a 
research agenda into the consequences of imperfect information. 
Stiglitz joined the faculty of MIT in 1966, spent time between 1969 and 1971 at the 
Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi under a Rockefeller 
Foundation grant, and then moved from university to university: Yale (1967–74), St 
Catherine’s College, Oxford (Visiting Fellow, 1973–74), Stanford (1974–76), All Souls’ 
College, Oxford (1976–79), the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton (1978–79), 
Princeton University (1979–88), Stanford (1988–2000), and Columbia University (2000 
to date).   
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Stiglitz received the John Bates Clark Medal in 1979, awarded biennially by the 
American Economic Association for the most distinguished work by an economist under 
the age of 40.  In 1987, Stiglitz became founding editor of the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives. 
In 1993 Stiglitz joined President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors, which he 
chaired in 1995–97.  In 1997, Stiglitz was appointed to the position of Chief Economist 
of the World Bank.  The East Asian financial crisis occurred in 1997-99, and Stiglitz 
argued publicly against the policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) towards 
the crisis.   Disagreements arose both about the consequences of the policies (given the 
uncertainties about both the structure of the economy and future events), and about 
welfare judgments of the acceptable trade-offs between competing goals.  Stiglitz’s 
positions led to conflict with other officials in Washington. In November 1999, he 
resigned from the World Bank and returned to academia.   At Columbia, he co-founded 
the Initiative for Policy Dialogue, which studies policy issues and provides training to 
policymakers from developing countries.   
 
The economics of uncertainty 
The economics of uncertainty is concerned with the principles that an individual uses in 
evaluating a random distribution of returns.  Applications extend from how individuals 
allocate their portfolios between safe assets and risky assets, to how farmers allocate their 
land among different crops.  The work in the 1960s by James Tobin and others equated 
an increase in risk with an increase in variance.   Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) set forth 
an alternative definition of an increase in risk.  Comparing income distributions with the 
same mean, they proposed a definition that corresponded to a preference ordering among 
every expected-utility-maximizer with a concave utility function.  This ordering was not 
the same as a ranking based on increases in variance.  In a companion paper, Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1971) demonstrated the usefulness of their definition in deriving 
comparative static results.  They showed that such results depended on a simple criterion:  
the concavity or convexity of a ‘first-order condition’ characterizing the individual’s 
optimal decision with respect to the random variable that was the source of risk.  That 
work unified work in an area that until then had been in great confusion.   
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The economics of information 
In the 1960s, James Mirrlees (1971) began working on the problem of how a government 
could design an optimal tax schedule, taking into account that government can observe 
individuals’ incomes, but not their ability and effort.  Given this asymmetry of  
information, the analytical problem is to distribute a given tax burden according to 
differences in ability to pay.  Stiglitz recognized the similarities between this problem and 
the problems that arise in markets with asymmetric information.  For example, insurance 
companies and banks want to design a menu of offers that will maximize their profits, 
taking into account that they do not know each individual’s risk of accident or bankruptcy 
and the care that an individual expends to avoid the insured for event. Employers want to 
design labor contracts to maximize productivity, taking into account that they can 
observe only imperfectly workers’ ability and effort. Together with a small group of 
pioneers in the 1970s, and influenced in particular by Akerlof (1970) and Spence (1974), 
Stiglitz devised models in which these kinds of problems could be analyzed. The work on 
hidden characteristics (adverse selection) and incentive problems (moral hazard) came to 
be the core of the economics of information.  
  
Hidden characteristics  
A selection problem arises whenever there is imperfect information about the 
characteristics of the items being transacted, and different sides of the transaction know 
different things (so information is asymmetric).  This problem is pervasive. Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1976) constructed a celebrated model of the insurance market in which 
individuals differ only in terms of their privately known risk type, and the insurance firms 
know the overall distribution of risks in the population.  The model uses the canonical 
textbook apparatus of consumer choice – budget lines and indifference curves – but 
produces very surprising (and counter-Walrasian) results.  
To illustrate Stiglitz’s modus operandi – to begin with highly simplified models of 
particular markets that allow him to identify a general principle – I describe the 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) model in detail. 
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Consider a risk-averse individual whose situation is described by his income if he is 
lucky enough to avoid an accident (WNA) and his income if an accident occurs (WA ). His 
initial endowment point E is (W, W – d), where d represents the damages incurred in the 
accident. An individual purchases insurance in order to smooth his income across these 
two ‘states of nature.’ 
Begin with the benchmark case in which insurance companies know an individual’s 
probability of accident. Given this probability, let W  denote his expected income. Then 
competitive equilibrium would be at a point A, illustrated in Figure 1, where the 
insurance company breaks even and the individual’s indifference curve, denoted 
L U , is 
tangent to the budget line. Since risk-averse individuals who are offered a break-even 
price for insurance will choose full insurance, the equilibrium is along the 45 degree line. 
The line that goes through the endowment point E and the point A is the locus of 
contracts at which an insurance company breaks even (‘the fair-odds line’). 
Next, bring in asymmetric information.  Suppose that individuals are of two types that 
 differ in their accident probability, and each individual knows his own type.  Given the 
differences in risks, the high-risk individual has lower expected wealth (denoted W
)
 in 
Figure 2) than the low-risk individual (denoted W ). If the insurance company could 
observe who was low-risk and who was high-risk, then, on the same reasoning as above, 
the equilibrium contracts would be at A and B in Figure 2.  A higher accident probability 
gives rise to a flatter indifference curve (the two types’ indifference curves satisfy the 
‘single crossing property’), and also to more costly insurance (a flatter fair-odds line). If, 
however, the insurance firms do not know the characteristics of individuals, then clearly 
they cannot offer contracts A and B.  For in that case all individuals would claim they 
were the low-risk type and choose the contract A, and the insurance companies would not 
break even. Offers that survive the competitive process cannot specify a price at which 
customers choose to buy all the insurance they want, because the high-risk individuals 
would always purchase more insurance at that price than the low-risk individuals, and the 
insurance firms would not break even. Competitive offers of contracts instead consist of 
both a price and a quantity.  
Consider then the price and quantity offer at point C in Figure 3, which would break 
even if all individuals purchased it (a ‘pooling’ contract).  Rothschild and Stiglitz 
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demonstrate that this cannot be equilibrium. Any contract such as C′ in the shaded area in 
Figure 3 – with slightly less insurance coverage than C but at a lower price per dollar of 
coverage – would attract only the low-risk individuals. Given that, the contract C 
generates losses and would be withdrawn.   
The only possible equilibrium, which is illustrated in Figure 4, is one in which the 
market distinguishes types by offering a contract B with complete coverage (which will 
be chosen by the high-risk individuals), and a contract D with partial insurance coverage 
(which the low-risk individuals prefer to full insurance at B and which the high-risk 
individuals do not prefer to full insurance at B).  In this case, the market ‘solves’ the 
screening problem, but at the cost of foreclosing otherwise feasible and desirable 
exchanges.  
If, however, there are so few high-risk types that low-risk individuals are strictly 
better off at a pooling contract, then there can be no competitive equilibrium at all!  The 
pooling contract with full insurance breaks the candidate separating equilibrium, but a 
contract at a slightly lower price and lower quantity of insurance cream skims the low-
risk individuals.  Thus the contract with full insurance cannot break even and is 
withdrawn. 
With these intuitive graphs, Rothschild and Stiglitz demonstrate the nonrobustness to 
considerations of imperfect information of two central results of the neoclassical model—
that equilibrium is characterized by supply equals demand, and that equilibrium always 
exists. Their paper represented the market as a more complicated interaction—as a game 
in which the uninformed party uses a menu of contracts to screen individuals by their 
hidden characteristics. 
In papers published over the next two decades, Stiglitz demonstrated how market 
responses to the screening problem could explain puzzles in equity, credit, and labor 
markets. In equity markets, when insiders in a firm have more information than outsiders, 
the controlling insiders’ willingness to issue equity conveys a signal that says that on 
average the shares are overpriced.  The market responds by lowering the price. This 
discourages firms from issuing new shares and provides an explanation for the fact that 
firms have limited access to equity (Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984).  
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In credit markets, if prospective borrowers have more information than lenders about 
the riskiness of their investments, there are situations in which a lender will set his 
interest rate below the market-clearing rate. He will not wish to raise his interest rate to 
what the market will bear if an increase in the rate would lead the lowest-risk borrowers 
to drop out of the market and reduce the lender’s expected return.  In this case, credit 
rationing will occur, as demonstrated in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  
In many markets, individuals can, at a cost, provide credible information about their 
characteristics.  Then ‘hidden characteristics’ become public information.  This led 
Stiglitz to examine the incentives to acquire and transmit information.  A central point is 
that the private returns to the provision of information differ from the social returns; thus 
the level of information that is public in a signaling equilibrium has, in general, no 
efficiency properties. To see this, consider the following simple example from Stiglitz 
(1975).  
 Suppose that there are two ability types whose productivity is A
H and A
L (the more 
able can do in one hour what the less able take A
H /A
L hours to do).   Suppose a fraction 
of the population p is high ability and a fraction 1 – p is low ability.  Ability is private 
information but, at a cost C, an individual can reveal it (as would occur, for instance, if 
there is a credential that only a high-ability type is able to obtain but that certifies a skill 
unrelated to productivity).  Then there exist two equilibria – a separating equilibrium and 
a pooling equilibrium – if    
A
L    <   A
H – C   <   pA
H + [1 – p]A
L . 
 
If all other high-ability types screen, then the first inequality implies that the 
remaining high-ability individual has an incentive to screen.  In doing do, he earns more 
than his alternative wage in the screening equilibrium, A
L.  This establishes that a 
separating equilibrium exists.   
However, if no other high-ability types screen, then both types are paid their average 
productivity, and the second inequality implies that the remaining high-ability individual 
has no incentive to screen.  This establishes that a pooling equilibrium exists, as well, and 
that it Pareto dominates the separating equilibrium.  In the separating equilibrium, each 
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worker fails to take into account the effect of his decision to screen on the wage of 
unscreened individuals.   Individual decisions create a diffuse externality.    
The fact that the investor in information must obtain a positive expected private return 
from his information-gathering activities led Stiglitz to a fundamental result in finance. 
There had long been a theory, the efficient markets theory, which states that the 
observation of prices in capital markets suffices to reveal all relevant private information. 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) showed that the theory was incorrect:  if information is 
costly and markets are competitive, then there must be an ‘equilibrium degree of 
disequilibrium’ – persistent discrepancies between prices and ‘fundamental values’ that 
provide incentives for individuals to obtain information.  In capital markets, prices serve 
two functions: besides being used in the conventional way to clear markets, they also 
convey information. When individuals invest in information and thereby learn that the 
return to a security is going to be high (or low), they bid its price up (or down), and thus 
the price system makes that information publicly available.  But if all information were 
publicly conveyed, there would be no incentives for individuals to invest in information.   
Differential information can be a source of pure economic rents. Stiglitz argued that 
firms exploit that fact by creating ‘noise’.  Knowing that it is costly for customers to 
search, Salop and Stiglitz (1977) showed that stores can exploit that by varying their 
prices to extract rents from customers with high search costs. The market equilibrium 
prices serve to discriminate (imperfectly) among individuals with different search costs. 
These results overturned a standard theory, the law of the single price (a given 
commodity is sold at the same price in all stores).  In a similar vein, Edlin and Stiglitz 
(1995) argued that managers will have an incentive to enhance asymmetries of 
information between them and rival managers and boards of directors, and thereby limit 
the scope for takeovers.   
 
Hidden actions and agency theory 
In the standard neoclassical model, there are no conflicts of interest between 
economic actors.   Principal–agent theory introduces conflicts of interest by specifying 
actions that cannot be observed.  In this theory, a principal, who delegates a task to an 
agent, designs a contract that makes payment depend on observable circumstances (for 
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example, revenues) that are correlated with the desired, but unobservable, actions of the 
agent.  Stephen Ross, James Mirrlees, and Joe Stiglitz contemporaneously developed 
principal–agent theory.   
Stiglitz’s initial contribution was stimulated by his observations in Kenya during parts 
of 1969-71.  He analyzed a puzzle that had been recognized at least since Alfred Marshall 
– the apparent inefficiency of the institution of sharecropping, which assigns the tenant 
only a share of the marginal return to his effort.  Stiglitz (1974) showed that 
sharecropping could be advantageous to tenants and landlords because of the savings in 
monitoring costs compared to a wage system with costly monitoring, the increases in 
output compared with a wage system with imperfect monitoring, and the reduction in risk 
borne by tenants compared with a system where workers pay fixed land rents but do not 
have access to risk markets. 
 Four insights in this paper and Stiglitz’s other work in principal–agent theory have 
been important for further developments in economics.  
 
1.  It is sometimes useful to take the transaction, rather than the market, as the unit of 
analysis.  
2.  There is a trade-off between incentives and insurance if the principal has greater 
ability to bear risk than the agent.  Since the first-order effect of distorting incentives 
is zero, the provision of a small level of insurance is in this case always welfare-
increasing. 
3.  The distribution of wealth influences the extent of agency problems, in both rich and 
poor countries. 
4.  Agency problems are pervasive in a complex modern economy.  Agency theory has 
contributed to new theories of public finance, of corporate governance, and of 
positive political economy.  
 
However, in many situations, incentive contracts cannot be written because an 
individual’s individual contribution to output is not well observed.  In that case, pure 
economic rents can play an important role in providing incentives, as in Shapiro and 
Stiglitz (1983).  But integrating the idea of rents into a model of a competitive economy 
     13
initially posed a puzzle.  If price exceeds marginal cost, why doesn’t competition lead to 
price-cutting?   
An antecedent to Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) was the model in Shapiro (1983) of rents 
as an incentive to quality that is unobservable at the time of purchase.  In that model, 
firms develop a reputation for quality by the goods that they produce.  The prospect of 
the loss of rents to a firm that  ‘milks’ its reputation by selling at a high price less than the 
promised quality induces the firm to live up to consumers’ expectations. Competition 
does not lead to price-cutting because consumers come to learn that, if the price is too 
low, firms do not have an incentive to maintain their reputation, and therefore the offer of 
high-quality goods at a low price is not credible. 
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) extends to a labor market the idea of rents as an incentive 
device for difficult-to-monitor effort.  Workers in this model are identical (so there is no 
selection issue).  Firms observe at random intervals whether a worker is working or 
shirking.  To elicit effort, each firm would want to offer a higher wage than other firms so 
that, if it finds a worker shirking, he suffers a cost when he is fired.  But if it benefited 
one firm to raise its wage, it would benefit all firms. This might seem like the dilemma 
where, if every spectator in the stadium stands up to get a better view, no one sees any 
better.  But, when all employers raise their wages, those actions have a real effect on the 
economy:  unemployment emerges since the higher wage rations firms’ demand for 
workers.  Now a worker who is fired cannot immediately find another job.   This makes 
job loss costly.  Unemployment creates an incentive to work on the job rather than shirk, 




Informational imperfections limit the scope of equity and credit markets, as well as 
insurance and labor markets.  In a series of papers with Bruce Greenwald and Andrew 
Weiss (for example, Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1984), Stiglitz drew out the 
implications for the fluctuations in output and employment that have characterized 
capitalism throughout its history.  The central argument was this.  Limitations in the 
scope of equity markets in the presence of significant bankruptcy costs lead firms to 
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behave in a risk-averse manner. They pay attention to own risk, while traditional theory 
suggests that the only risk that firms should care about is the correlation with the stock 
market.  Higher levels of investment or production entail increased debt, and, as debt is 
increased, the bankruptcy probability is increased.  Firms will therefore produce and 
invest only up to the point where expected marginal returns equal expected marginal 
bankruptcy costs. This has four implications that contrast with what would occur with 
perfect markets:   
1.  Amplification of small shocks.  Changes in the net worth of the firm or in the 
riskiness of the environment affect the production and investment decisions of the firm 
(in contrast to the standard theory).  For a highly leveraged firm, small changes in 
demand can result in large changes in output and employment.  Thus, disturbances to the 
economy tend to be amplified.  
2.  Persistence.  If for some reason net worth is reduced at a given time, production 
falls in subsequent periods. Only gradually will production be restored to normal, as net 
worth builds up again.  
3.  Risk-averse banks.  Banks are a specialized kind of firm whose production activity 
is making loans. A reduction in the net worth of banks and an increase in the riskiness of 
their environment will lead them to contract their output – that is, to make fewer loans, 
which has multiplier effects throughout the economy.  
4.  Worsening of the applicant pool for loans during a recession.  For any given 
bankruptcy cost, there is a critical net worth such that, below that net worth, firms act in a 
risk-loving manner, and, above that net worth, in a risk-averse manner. If the economy 
moves into a recession and firms find their net worth decreases, good (that is, risk-averse) 
firms reduce their loan applications, bad (that is, risk-loving ) firms increase their loan 
applications, so that there is an increasing proportion of bad (that is, low net worth) 
applicants. These effects may be so strong as to lead to a situation where banks make no 
loans at all! 
During Stiglitz’s tenure as Chief Economist of the World Bank, the contrast between 
his perspective on macroeconomics and the perspective based on well-functioning 
markets came to a head. These are two starkly different ways of looking at the world.  If 
there are well-functioning markets, then opening up capital markets will lead to efficient 
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outcomes.  This view was identified with the US Treasury Department and the IMF in the 
1990s.  During the 1997–99 East Asian financial crisis, a condition of IMF financial 
support was that the East Asian economies adopt contractionary fiscal and monetary 
policies. The contractionary monetary policy would raise interest rates and, at some 
point, reverse private capital outflows and restore the ability of the East Asian countries 
to repay their foreign debts. It was argued that the basic reason for the East Asian 
financial crisis was lack of transparency, or corruption, in the business practices of these 
economies, which frightened away foreign investors.   
In contrast, Furman and Stiglitz (1998) argued that a lack of transparency did not 
cause the crisis (although it aggravated the effects of the downturn once it began). They 
argued that small developing countries are financially fragile. There are pervasive 
externalities in banks’ and firms’ decisions to obtain short-term loans from abroad. Each 
bank and each firm takes the risk environment as given, and yet the aggregate set of 
decisions determines the risk of a financial crisis. This meant that some limits on free 
capital markets were appropriate in developing countries.  Moreover, Furman and Stiglitz 
argued that policies that increased interest rates in the East Asian economies would 
greatly erode the net worth of debtors, and the erosion of their net worth would lead to a 
recession that could not easily be reversed.  
Stiglitz’s views ultimately were influential.  However, the openness of his conflict 
with the IMF and US Treasury frayed his relationships with many people in Washington 
and hastened his departure from the World Bank. 
 
Development economics  
Whereas macroeconomics remains split between different schools with contrasting views 
on the importance of market imperfections, the centrality of market imperfections in the 
field of development economics is not questioned.  Before the development of the 
economics of information (and also the development of game theoretic models of 
political economy), economists lacked a broad framework for understanding of the 
sources of the imperfections in markets. Economists who tried to design policies to fit 
developing country markets generally assumed rigidities in markets, but did not explain 
them by reference to a choice-based perspective. Abhijit Banerjee (2001, p. 465) has 
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characterized development economics in this era as the ‘ugly duckling’ of economics:   
‘It was full of strange assumptions and contrary logic, and all the other [fields of] 
economics made fun of it.’     
Stiglitz’s work in development economics played a major role in transforming the 
field.  His models were important in establishing (a) that positive feedback mechanisms 
can give rise to multiple equilibria and underdevelopment traps; (b) that, because the 
causes of market failures and constraints on growth vary greatly from setting to setting, 
analysis has to be done case by case; and (c) that non-market institutions need have no 
efficiency properties.  Important applications of these ideas are below.  
Trade-off between diversity of goods and scale economies.  In a path-breaking model, 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) posed a question seemingly unrelated to development.  This 
paper addressed the question: will a market solution yield the socially optimum kinds and 
quantities of commodities if there are multiple possible varieties of goods, each produced 
by a single firm with increasing returns to scale in production?  The desire by consumers 
for diversity meant that there would be many firms, but not necessarily the optimal 
number.   
Dixit and Stiglitz used a modeling assumption that turned out to be very useful 
analytically. By assuming a continuum of goods, their set-up lets the modeler respect the 
discrete nature of many location decisions and yet analyze the model in terms of the 
behavior of continuous variables like the share of manufacturing in a particular region.  
This model became a building block in models in the new fields of endogenous 
growth theory and economic geography.  To understand the flavor of this work, consider 
an economy with three sectors:  a low-technology sector, an advanced sector, and an 
intermediate sector that produces an array of non-traded, i.e., domestic, goods, modeled 
as Dixit–Stiglitz commodities, which are inputs into the advanced sector. An expansion 
of the advanced sector increases the demand for non-traded inputs, and so lowers their 
average costs and increases the available variety. With a greater variety of intermediate 
inputs, production in the advanced sector is more efficient. It can thus be the case that, 
when many other firms enter the advanced sector, it pays the remaining firms in the 
traditional sector to do so; but, when all other firms remain in the traditional, low-
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technology sector, it pays the remaining firm to do so, too.  A low-level equilibrium can 
therefore be sustained even when the economy is fully open to international trade. 
Breakdown of the Washington consensus.  The standard neoclassical model predicts 
that growth is inevitable in capital-poor market economies:  over time, all economies will 
converge in per capita income.  This model led a generation of economists to a simple set 
of policy prescriptions that would set the preconditions for growth:  maintain 
macroeconomic stability (since high inflation interferes with the workings of the price 
system), limit government ownership of enterprise, and deregulate (‘stabilize, privatize, 
and liberalize’).  This so-called Washington consensus has broken down, in part because 
it has become clear that there are no sure-fire formulas for success, and in part because of 
the evolution of economic theory away from the perfect markets paradigm.  The three 
central and closely related developments in economic theory have been the economics of 
information, game theory, and institutional economics.  In the new economic theory, 
development is no longer seen primarily as a process of capital accumulation, but instead 
as a process of organizational change.  Evidence of the breakdown of the Washington 
consensus is that a recent World Bank volume that reviews economic growth in 
developing countries in the 1990s states that ‘The central message of this volume is that 
there is no unique universal set of rules [to promote growth]..[W]e need to get away from 
formulae and the search for elusive ‘best practices’....’ (World Bank, 2005, p. xiii).  
Dysfunctional institutions.  In the past, many scholars have made the argument that 
institutions that emerge out of individual actions are necessarily optimal: they are there 
because their benefits outweigh the costs. Stiglitz’s work on sharecropping (Stiglitz 1974) 
exemplifies that approach. However, as Stiglitz has often remarked, that analysis is 
partial equilibrium.  That analysis studies the optimal contract while holding fixed 
everything else in the economy. 
In many cases, however, contracts that individuals enter into impose externalities on 
other agents.  There may be no forces that ensure the Pareto efficiency of the set of 
contracts that individuals adopt.  For instance, when insurance is provided through family 
and friends as well as through the market, the informal insurance will raise welfare if it 
provides (sufficient) peer monitoring (Arnott and Stiglitz, 1990), but, otherwise, such 
insurance will lower welfare because the additional insurance exacerbates moral hazard 
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and so raises the cost of market insurance – an effect that no individual internalizes.  The 
analysis of the inefficiency of contracting choices generalizes widely, for example, to 
technological change (Acemoglu, 1997), to neighborhood formation (Hoff and Sen, 
2005), and to institutional change, as I discuss next. 
One of the most important economic transformations in modern history began with 
the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  The 
transition process in the 1990s entailed the creation of a new set of economic and 
political institutions and, in most countries, produced an unexpectedly deep and 
prolonged depression.  In Russia and many other transition countries, the rapid transfer of 
state enterprises to private hands (‘Big Bang privatization’) did not lead to a political 
demand for institutional reforms needed to govern private property, as many economists 
had expected.  Hoff and Stiglitz (2004; 2007) investigate the influence of economic 
policies on the demand for a rule of law.  They show that Big Bang privatization can 
create powerful incentives to strip assets and to delay the establishment of a rule of law.   
This may result in a long period of economic decline. The cause is that no individual 
takes account of the effect of his economic choices on long-run institutional change. 
 
Evaluation 
The high level of idealization in much of Stiglitz’s formal work, and the surprising (or at 
least counter-Walrasian) results often obtained, have led his harshest critics to see in his 
work a predilection for the intriguing exception rather than the general rule: granted that 
market failures occur, how much do they really matter?  From a staunch admirer, 
Avinash Dixit, one hears the statement that a paper by Stiglitz begins with the phrase, 
‘Assume there are two types’. However, the statement that ‘there are two types’ (or ‘two 
actions’) in Stiglitz’s papers of the 1970s and 1980s marked a radical departure from the 
standard model, which implicitly assumes that in each market there is only one type (or 
one action ); that is, that information in the market is symmetric.  This modest relaxation 
of the perfect information assumption reveals that symmetric information is essential to 
the results of the standard neoclassical paradigm.   
Stiglitz’s work demonstrates that the standard theory misconstrues many of the virtues 
of the market.  The standard theory exaggerates the role of prices in conveying 
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information about scarcity, and fails to take account of the difficulties of making the price 
system work.  At the same time, the standard theory fails to recognize some central 
virtues of the market – its ability to address problems of selection, incentives, information 
gathering, and innovation – because the standard paradigm is silent about all these 
problems.  
Compared to the state of economics in 1970, mainstream theory can now 
accommodate a far broader ranger of phenomena.  But there is no unified single 
framework, as there was in the Walrasian paradigm.  Instead, there is a fragmented 
collection of disparate models.  Distinct models are capable of explaining the same 
phenomena but are difficult to distinguish empirically.   
A further problem that remains for future work is that multiple forms of private 
information exist within any sector.  With multiple incentive problems, it is necessary to 
consider the distortions that result when incentives for more easily observed actions are 
created at the expense of less easily observed actions.   
In these ways, Stiglitz’s theoretical work has contributed to the resurgence of 
empirical work in economics.  Kim, Morse and Zingales (2006) document a reversal in 
the previous 30 years in the importance of theoretical work, which dominated the 
profession in the 1970s and 1980s, and gave way to the primacy of empirical work in the 
early 1990s.  Much of that empirical work is a response to a body of theory that 
established that neither markets nor governments work perfectly.   Stiglitz’s 
demonstration that imperfect information undermines the results of the standard 
neoclassical model has shifted not only models of thought in economics, but also the 
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